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100% of the requirements in the future. If defense 
acquisition improves its ability to adapt to changing 
battlefields, the Warfighter will have new and better 
equipment faster, thereby improving operations. 
The last JECP off the production line 
will be better than the first.
____________
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Future Conflict: Adapting Better 
and Faster Than an Adversary
By Maj. Hassan M. Kamara
Program Executive Office 
for Missiles and Space
“There are no crystal balls that can predict the 
demands of future armed conflict. That is 
why I believe our ability to learn and adapt 
rapidly is an institutional imperative.” 
—Gen. Martin E. Dempsey 
(U.S. Army, Retired Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff)
A. Introduction
This paper studies how the U.S. Army can technolog-
ically adapt better and faster than a peer or near-peer 
adversary in a future conflict. The Army cannot predict 
future wars with certainty, thus it should ensure that 
it can rapidly adapt to the changing realities inherent 
in war. The need for this study is underscored in part 
by the 2015 National Military Strategy of the United 
States, which states that the potential for U.S. “in-
volvement in interstate war with a major power” is 
growing, and mandates that the U.S. military “be 
able to rapidly adapt to new threats.”1  Technolo-
gy alone will not suffice to defeat an adversary in a 
future conflict, but it is vital to doing so. According 
to Sir Michael Howard, technology is but one of 
the dimensions in which war has been conducted 
in the past—the others being operational, logistical 
and social—“but technology, as an independent and 
significant dimension” cannot be disregarded.2  
So how can the Army technologically adapt better and 
faster than a peer or near-peer adversary in a future 
conflict? The Army can technologically adapt better 
and faster than a peer or near-peer adversary in a 
future conflict by manipulating the process of wartime 
adaptation. The study uses John Boyd’s OODA frame-
work for fast, dynamic transitions—Observe, Orient, 
Decide and Act (OODA)—as a lens to analyze the 
process of wartime adaptation and highlight ways the 
Army can manipulate this process for faster evolution. 
This study is relevant because U.S. technological superi-
ority in a potential conflict with a peer or near-peer ad-
versary is not guaranteed. In a 2015 statement under-
scoring the need for greater Research and Development 
investment, the acting Assistant Secretary of the Army 
for Acquisition Logistics and Technology [ASA(ALT)] 
the Honorable Katrina McFarland voiced concern that 
U.S. “technological superiority is not assured.”3  In a 
RAND study, Roger Cliff examined China’s military 
and technological growth, and warned that “the U.S. 
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military, including the U.S. Air force must prepare for 
the possibility of conflict…with a Chinese military 
that by 2020 will be significantly more advanced than 
it is at present.”4  It is highly possible that in a future 
conflict with a peer or near-peer adversary—despite 
current peacetime innovation efforts—the Army could 
realize it lacks technological superiority, and will have 
to rapidly adapt to regain a technological edge, or 
mitigate an adversary’s technical advantages. Such 
was the case with tank technology during Operation 
Overlord in World War II. According to General of 
the Army Omar Bradley, the Army had to adapt both 
tactics and capabilities to compensate for the techno-
logical inferiority of its main battle tank—the U.S. M4 
Sherman tank—relative to German tanks.5  According 
to Bradley, the 50-ton German, Mark V Panther tank 
with its “long-barreled high-velocity 75mm gun…
and its tapered hull was more than a match for our 
Shermans.”6  This was because the Sherman’s 75-mm 
gun was ineffective against the heavy frontal plate 
of the Panther tanks, so according to Bradley it was 
“only by swarming around the panzers to hit them 
on the flank, could our Shermans knock the enemy 
out.”7  Bradley wrote that the Army adapted by de-
signing and fielding 76-mm guns on its M4 Sherman 
tanks, as well as dual use long-rifled 90mm guns.8 
B. Concepts
A brief discussion of military adaptation in war, 
peacetime innovation, and the OODA framework 
is essential to understanding the ensuing analysis. 
Military adaptation is transformation that occurs 
amidst war, typically in response to the actions and 
capabilities of an adversary relative to one’s opera-
tional objectives. Military adaptation differs from the 
generally slower-paced innovation that occurs during 
peacetime. Williamson Murray similarly characterized 
and distinguished military adaptation and peacetime 
innovation; he wrote that “while there are similarities 
between the processes of innovation and adaptation, 
the environments in which they occur are radically 
different.”9  Murray explained that while peacetime 
innovation enjoys the luxury of time to consid-
er transformational objectives and challenges, and 
gradually evolve, wartime adaptation sees less time 
for transformation due to the “the terrible pressures 
of war as well as an interactive, adaptive opponent 
who is trying to kill us.”10  Wartime adaptation is 
an enduring challenge for militaries. According to 
Williamson Murray “the problem of adaptation in war 
represents one of the most persistent, yet rarely exam-
ined problems that military institutions confront.”11
Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act, commonly 
referred to as the “OODA loop” are interrelated 
actions of a construct for dynamic and fast transi-
tions that can disorient an adversary. According to 
John Boyd, “without OODA loops…and without 
the ability to get inside other OODA loops (or other 
environments), we will find it impossible to com-
FIGURE 1       The OODA “loop” sketch12
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prehend, shape, adapt to and in turn be shaped by 
an unfolding evolving reality that is uncertain, ever 
changing, and unpredictable.”  War is such a real-
ity, which makes the application of OODA to the 
challenge of wartime adaptation particularly apt. 13
The OODA is not always a neatly sequenced loop 
or cycle. It can be compressed with increased under-
standing of an environment or situation—resulting 
in direct transitions between observation and action 
(see Figure 2). According to Robert Coram, “under-
standing the OODA Loop enables a commander 
to compress time—that is time between observing 
a situation and taking an action.”14  This ability to 
compress time is invaluable in wartime adaptation.
C. Wartime Adaptation and the OODA
The components of the OODA construct correlate 
to the process of wartime adaptation—reference 
Figure 2—which makes OODA an excellent tool 
for analyzing wartime adaptation. There is a sensing 
and learning component to the wartime adaptation 
process that correlates to the Observe and Orient 
components of the OODA construct. The acquisi-
tion cycle, and the capability fielding and integration 
aspects of the wartime adaptation process respec-
tively correlate to the Decide, and Act components 
of the OODA construct. This fundamental cor-
relation facilitates the ensuing analysis of wartime 
adaptation using the OODA construct, and under-
scores the OODA’s applicability to comprehending 
and enhancing the wartime adaptation process.
1. OBSERVE: The Army can adapt faster than an 
adversary by improving its ability to rapidly record 
and analyze data from military operations to foster 
learning. Faster technological adaptation during 
war requires optimizing the Army’s ability to gather 
equipment performance data and war-fighter expe-
riences during combat operations. The U.S. Navy 
understood this imperative in World War II. Accord-
ing to Stephen Peter Rosen, the Navy understood that 
“scientists also needed to be in the field to measure 
the combat performance of new equipment and to 
refine and adjust the new technology and operating 
practices developed for it…[so] it sent 464 scientists 
to field commands to help…develop antisubma-
rine warfare and tactics, and to refine the electronic 
warfare capabilities of the Army and Air forces.”15  
In lieu of prudently exposing the scientific commu-
nity to military operations, commercially available 
telemetry technologies can be leveraged to help the 
Army gather data on equipment performance during 
ongoing operations to foster organizational learning. 
FIGURE 2  Wartime adaptation within the OODA framework
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2. ORIENT: The Army can adapt faster than an 
adversary by developing and enforcing mechanisms 
that promote organizational learning. The latter is a 
central component in the process of wartime adap-
tation, and requires taking what is being observed in 
military operations, and rapidly disseminating them to 
Army decision makers and defense industry partners 
to synthesize solutions.  According to Meir Finkel, 
“an important factor in recoverability from tech-
nological and doctrinal surprise is the abili-
ty to derive lessons while the surprise is tak-
ing place…devising immediate solutions and 
circulating them throughout the Army.”16
Rapid wartime adaptation requires organizationally 
supported mechanisms for rapidly disseminating 
the lessons being learned from the ongoing fight.
3. DECIDE: The Army can adapt faster in wartime by 
studying, developing, and implementing alternatives 
to reduce acquisition cycle times. These alternatives 
should orient on some of the institutionally recog-
nized contributors to long acquisition cycle times. In 
his work examining Department of Defense, and US 
Air Force efforts to reduce acquisition cycle times in 
the 80s and 90s, Ross T. McNutt highlighted some key 
contributors to slower acquisition cycle times as: lower 
prioritization of schedule relative to cost and perfor-
mance by program managers, extensive pre-acquisition 
Milestone A review processes, poor transition of tech-
nology from the scientific, research and development 
community to the war-fighters, funding limitations 
based on funding processes, and little to no work-
force training on acquisition cycle time reduction.17
Some alternatives to counter the above contributors 
to slower acquisition cycle times include greater 
emphasis on schedule as a variable, streamlining 
requirements in the review processes for milestone 
decisions, and utilizing mature and viable emerging 
technologies in concert with a modular open system 
architecture. Consistent with the latter, Dan Ward 
advocates taking advantage of existing, and mature 
emerging technologies during design, versus over-rely-
ing on longer development of immature technologies 
(specified as those at DoD and NASA’s Technology 
Readiness Level 6), to help reduce acquisition cycle 
times and cost, as well as deliver viable capabilities.18
Congress and the Defense industry are critical 
stakeholders in wartime adaptation. Consistent 
with the spirit of the 2016 Acquisition Agility Act, 
Congress can institute war-activated provisions 
that curtail the myriad of funding and bureaucratic 
regulations that slow the contracting and acquisi-
tion lifecycle process. The Army should also build 
industry partnerships that can rapidly produce 
the capability solutions vital to overcoming tech-
nological surprise, and operational challenges.
4. ACT: In terms of wartime adaptation, this aspect 
of the OODA construct deals with the rapid fielding, 
integration and sustainment of new capabilities into 
army operations. The Army can adapt faster than 
an adversary by improving its ability to rapidly field, 
integrate and sustain the paradigm-changing solutions 
generated in response to the lessons learned in ongo-
ing operations.  Adapting to German tanks wielding 
superior armor and guns, the U.S. Army in 1944 
introduced a new Hyper Velocity Armor-Piercing 
round (HVAP), but according to David Johnson, even 
by the spring of 1945 the HVAPs were still in short 
supply to forces in Europe; delaying its benefits to on-
going operations.19  This underscores the importance 
of rapidly fielding and integrating paradigm-chang-
ing capabilities to the wartime adaptation process.
D. Conclusion
This study—by framing the process of wartime 
adaptation within Boyd’s OODA construct—has 
highlighted how the U.S. Army can manipulate 
said process to evolve faster than a peer or near-peer 
adversary in a future conflict. Meanwhile, as the 
Army continues to innovate in largely peacetime 
conditions at home—despite fighting low-intensi-
ty conflicts overseas—ensuing studies should fo-
cus on ways to expedite the peacetime innovation 
process to deliver viable, low-cost capabilities.
____________
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Expeditionary Situational Awareness at 
the Tip of the Spear: Preparing for Fu-
ture Operations through Innovation
By Lt. Col. James Howell
Department of the Army 
System Coordinator (DASC) 
for Defensive Cyber and 
the Handheld, Manpack, 
Small Form Fit Program
The U.S. Army’s Global Response Force (GRF) re-
mains ready to conduct joint forcible-entry airborne 
assaults with little or no warning. Flying out to seize 
an enemy airfield or port facility requires state-of-the-
art doctrine, cutting edge leaders, aggressive training, 
a tailored communications support package, adaptive 
logistics processes and functions, and rapidly deploy-
able capabilities. The Army is providing the GRF 
with new highly-adaptable, scalable and tailorable 
expeditionary technologies, such as Enroute Mission 
Command (EMC), which provides inflight network 
connectivity, the Transportable Tactical Command 
Communications system (T2C2) as well as develop-
ing the new Two Channel Leader Radio which will 
support both early entry and tactical edge operations. 
Technologies like these enable an advanced mis-
sion command network and provide the situational 
Paratroopers from the XVIII Airborne Corps and 82nd Airborne 
Division successfully utilized Enroute Mission Command Capability 
(EMC2) during the Joint Forcible Entry (JFE) exercise at the National 
Training Center/Fort Irwin, Calif., August 5-6, 2015.  
(U.S. Army photo)
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awareness required to rapidly seize an initiative and 
dominate our nation’s enemies on the battlefield. 
America’s Guard of Honor, the 82nd Airborne Di-
vision, is the Army’s GRF unit. The GRF must 
remain ready to adapt to unpredictable security 
environments, which requires operational flexibility 
and versatility. To prepare for its unique mission set 
in support of Geographic Combatant Command-
ers’ urgent operational needs, the GRF continually 
conducts readiness exercises, mission planning, and 
rehearsals, while staging combat power at Fort 
Bragg’s Pope Army Airfield in North Carolina. 
Joint Forces Make These Exercises  
Operationally Relevant 
After an initial call to duty, Commanders and support 
units immediately begin to plan an operation. Once 
on the tarmac at Pope Army Airfield, Jumpmasters 
load Air Force C-17 Globemaster aircraft in “chalk 
order.” Designing a chalk order supporting an airborne 
assault requires a great deal of planning and attention 
to detail. Planners must thoroughly examine the drop 
zone, understand and plan for potential enemy actions, 
and comprehend the command and control (C2) net-
work, the mission and its players. Paratroopers with C2 
capabilities will be placed in specific positions in the 
chalk order to ensure they land close to command post 
assembly areas strategically placed on the drop zone.   
The C-17s quickly become airborne, assembling in 
assault formation. Then Commanders and the GRF 
staff use their EMC systems to conduct operational 
coordination and receive the latest intelligence, which 
they share with other aircraft in the formation. Para-
troopers view full motion video from Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles of the evolving situation on the drop 
zone on large LED screens throughout the aircraft. 
Amid the hum of the C-17s, Commanders and Para-
troopers leverage mission command functions and 
plane-to-plane and plane-to-ground communications 
for a common operating picture shared throughout 
the entire brigade and with the rest of the Joint and 
coalition forces that may be supporting the operation.  
Paratroopers stand in their chalk lines in the aircraft 
as the assault force arrives at the drop-zone armed 
not only with weapons, but with night vision gog-
gles, radios and early entry network communications 
equipment. One at a time over the drop-zone, they 
hand their static lines to the Jumpmaster controlling 
the door and then jump. The assault force may 
hear gunfire on the drop zone as they keep a sharp 
lookout for fellow jumpers, but they know what to 
expect, having already seen video of the battlespace 
below and having received mission updates from the 
Commander through the EMC back on the plane. 
Once on the drop zone, troops immediately place 
weapons into operation and move quickly to their 
Paratroopers from the XVIII Airborne Corps and 82nd Airborne 
Division successfully utilized Enroute Mission Command Capability 
(EMC2) during the Joint Forcible Entry (JFE) exercise at the National 
Training Center/Fort Irwin, Calif., Aug. 5-6, 2015. EMC2 provides 
inflight network communications, situational awareness and mission 
command capabilities to Global Response Force Commanders and Para-
troopers, giving them a comprehensive understanding of the potential 
challenges waiting for them on the drop zone. (U.S. Army photo)
Paratroopers prepare to jump during the large-scale joint Army/Air Force 
Joint Forcible Entry exercise in December 2015, where Soldiers success-
fully employed Enroute Mission Command capability (EMC), while en 
route from Fort Bragg, N.C., to Nellis Air Force Base, Nev. This network 
communications capability enabled the unit to obtain the inflight 
mission command and plane-to-plane, plane-to-ground communications 
needed for a successful parachute assault. (U.S. Army photo by Cpt. Lisa 
Beum, 1st BCT, 82nd ABN DIV, PAO)
 — 18  —
Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene Awards for Acquisition Writing
pre-designated command post sites. Paratroopers 
establish a communications link for accountability 
on their software defined Rifleman Radios, which 
also provide situational awareness and input into 
mission command systems and the common opera-
tional picture. Accountability following an airborne 
operation is critical to the assault forces, as the units 
begin to mass combat power to seize the objective. 
Soon the Army will employ the Two Channel Lead-
er Radio which will significantly enhance the GRF’s 
ability to C2 to the tactical edge of the battlespace. 
The Airborne Assault, Seizing the Initiative, 
and Dominating the Enemy 
Paratroopers, following the initial airborne assault, 
seizing the initiative, and dominating the enemy on 
the battlefield, will soon be able to establish an initial 
command post with communications enabled by the 
Transportable Tactical Command Communications 
(T2C2) “jumpable” Lite and “air droppable” Heavy 
systems. Utilizing an inflatable antenna, T2C2 enables 
network connectivity, via satellite to the Army’s tactical 
communications network, Warfighter Information 
Network– Tactical (WIN-T). These early entry forces 
can obtain the advanced situational awareness and mis-
sion command capabilities needed to conduct an early 
entry operation and set the stage for follow-on forces, 
with the scalable buildup of additional network infra-
structure. In later operations, T2C2 will extend the 
Army’s network to the tactical edge by enabling com-
mand post/forward operating base communications. 
Once the airfield is secured, giant C-130 and C-17 
aircraft scream in to deliver larger equipment so the 
unit can set up the Army’s mobile tactical WIN-T 
network. This high capacity satellite and line-of-sight 
network provides advanced mission command, voice, 
video and data capability, both at the halt in a com-
mand post, and on the move in network-equipped 
vehicles. As the supply planes fly in, the unit builds 
up the network with WIN-T as well as Joint Ca-
pabilities Release/Blue Force Tracking 2 capability, 
enabling situational awareness of friendly forces and 
digital command and control down to the platoon 
and squad levels. These two capabilities complement 
one another across the Brigade Combat Team (BCT); 
even though some echelons may not be connected to 
the WIN-T network, having both capabilities enables 
the entire BCT to stay connected and operational-
ly informed. Additionally, the Army will soon be 
fielding Wi-Fi capability to improve command post 
agility during maneuver, cutting command post 
set up and tear down times from hours to minutes 
and reducing interruption of situational awareness.
The GRF represents “the tip of the spear,” our first 
national large-scale combat ready BCT. The U.S. 
Joint Forces, the Department of Defense and the 
Army Staff are continually working to ensure this 
force presents the most lethal, trained, and equipped 
unit possible, whether they are supporting combat or 
The Army will use two sizes of the inflatable satellite antenna for the 
Low Rate Initial Production of Transportable Tactical Command 
Communications (T2C2) Lite (v1) and T2C2 Heavy (v2). During 
Joint Forcible Entry operations at Network Integration Evaluation 16.1 
in October 2015, the 82nd Airborne Division successfully utilized the 
capability to provide early entry network communications during the 
mission. (Photo by Jett Loe, Sun-News) 
Because the T2C2 solution is inflatable, it can provide a larger dish size 
with increased capability and bandwidth efficiency in a smaller package.  
The Army will use two sizes of the inflatable satellite antenna for the Low 
Rate Initial Production of Transportable Tactical Command Communi-
cations (T2C2) Lite (v1) and T2C2 Heavy (v2).  
(U.S. Army photo) 
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humanitarian operations. Joint forces are constantly 
evaluating, testing, training and evolving the GRF. 
The Army frequently conducts analysis to ensure 
the latest and best Doctrine, Organization, Training, 
Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Policy 
(DOTMLPF-P) is employed as the GRF prepares 
to meet, engage and destroy our nation’s enemies.
“If You Know the Enemy and Know 
Yourself, You Need Not Fear the 
Result of a Hundred Battles”
In “The Art of War” Sun Tzu writes, “If you know 
the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the 
result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself 
but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will 
also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy 
nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.” In 
essence, information is power and overmatch. U.S. 
forces require the most advanced mission com-
mand, communications and situational awareness 
possible as we meet with and engage our nation’s 
enemies. Programs like EMC, T2C2, the Rifleman 
and Leader Radio will provide these new and emerg-
ing expeditionary network technologies. As the tip 
of the spear combat force, it is imperative the GRF 
know itself, its mission and the enemy that it faces 
head-on in battle. Today’s mission command net-
work technologies are helping to provide that view.
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Lt. Col. Mark Henderson, product manager for Warfighter Information 
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onboard a C-17 aircraft in flight during a Joint Forcible Entry exercise in 
December 2015. (U.S. Army photo by Cpt. Lisa Beum, 1st BCT, 82nd 
ABN DIV, PAO)
EMC2 provides inflight network communications and mission com-
mand to increase the situational awareness of the Global Response Force. 
In this photo, a Soldier prepares for an EMC2 demonstration on May 
14, 2015, at Pope Army Airfield, Fort Bragg, N.C. (U.S. Army photo by 
Amy Walker, PEO C3T)
